Thai grassroots activists known as 'redshirts' (broadly aligned with former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra) have been characterized accordingly to their socio-economic profile, but despite pioneering works such as Buchanan (2013), Cohen (2012) and Uenaldi (2014) , there is still much to learn about how ordinary redshirts voice their political stances. This paper is based on a linguistic approach to discourse analysis and builds on Fairclough's (2003) arguments concerning the ways in which speakers use intertextuality and assumption to construct social and political difference and consensus. It specifically explores redshirt understandings of democracy by examining intertextuality and presupposition through various linguistic strategies. It sets out to answer these questions: What are grassroots redshirt protesters' understandings of democracy? How do they articulate those understandings verbally? The study is based on an analysis of 12 interviews conducted in 2012 with grassroots redshirts from Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand. It shows how informants voiced notions of democracy by making explicit intertextual references and alluding to implicit meaning through presupposition. The results show that informants had a definite understanding of democracy despite a degree of contradiction, confusion, and ambiguity.
Introduction
This article examines the political language of grassroots redshirt protesters in Thailand (henceforth, redshirts), a socially underprivileged group who have often been negatively portrayed in the Thai mainstream media and in elite discourse. The language of political conflicts has previously been extensively examined from a critical discourse perspective.
Often investigated are discourses of powerful figures, both politicians (for example, Bhatia, 2009; Chilton, 2003; Wodak, 2007) and news media (Bekalu, 2006; Callaghan and Schnell, 2001 , for example). While previous research has demonstrated how gatekeepers of power employ different strategies to legitimize their position and remain in control of their respective domains of influence, little is known about how emerging oppositional forces respond to the gatekeepers' rhetoric and try to claim political space. Major political change, as in the 2011 Arab Spring revolution in Egypt (Hamdy, 2012) , is often driven by ordinary people taking to the streets. In developing democracies such as Thailand, as more and more ordinary people from the lower strata of society begin to see themselves as stakeholders in national politics, more research into their beliefs about democracy and political participation is urgently needed.
Redshirt activists emerged on the political scene after the September 2006 military coup d'état after months of street protests organized by the largely royalist, conservative
People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) against popularly elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, whom they despised and accused of corruption and abuse of power. It is hard to understate the degree to which police-officer-turned-telecoms-billionaire Thaksin gradually antagonized the traditional elite -who declared him 'toxic' -and eventually polarized the whole of Thai society (see McCargo 2011) . Claiming to fight for democracy and seeking to counter the anti-Thaksin movement, the redshirts, predominantly from the North and the relatively impoverished Northeast, staged a series of post-coup, broadly pro-Thaksin protests little public resistance, even from diehard redshirt activists, the self-proclaimed guardians of democracy. Coup leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha, who did not hesitate to clamp down harshly on all forms of dissent, was readily able to appoint himself prime minister. The ease with which democratic modes of government could be suspended helps account for the knowing, subaltern view of politics adopted by redshirt activists.
Understanding the Redshirt Movement
The redshirt movement was a mass movement with hundreds of thousands of members: some of them were aligned with the national-level UDD, while others formed local groups often linked to self-help activities and to local radio stations. The redshirts were strongest in major provinces of the North and Northeast, including Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Khon Kaen, Udon Thani and Ubon Rachathani. They were often depicted by their opponents as mere followers masterminded by Thaksin: unsophisticated, vulgar, violent, uneducated and paid protesters who should remain in the countryside rather than contaminating civilised Bangkok, caricatured as 'from the countryside, less educated, and abandoned by the government for so long (New York Times, 23 May 2010).' They were derided as khwai, 'water buffaloes' (Thai Post, 31 May 2013), a by-word in Thai for dim-witted ignorance. However, scholarly work on the redshirts has noted that the protesters were legitimate stakeholders in Thai politics, and were not simply paid protesters (see Keyes, 2012; Naruemon and McCargo, 2011; and Walker, 2012 , for example). Far from being simply 'poor farmers', most redshirt activists were 'urbanized villagers' who were registered to vote in the provinces but derived the great majority of their income from non-farming activity, especially from small businesses and from selling their labour in urban areas (Naruemon and McCargo 2011: 1000-09).
War of Words 5
The redshirts' emergence after the 2006 coup should have been a warning against elite complacency towards grassroots grievances. The reasons why the redshirts' demands provoked such a fierce counterattack in 2010 reflected the Thai political context, in which discourse tends to be dominated by voices from the centre, strongly characterised by didacticism, paternalism and what by western standards would be considered heavy-handed moralising. The discrepancy between the dominant voice of the capital city and the muted expressions of the countryside was captured in an influential argument coined by Thai political scientist Anek Laothamatas. Anek (1996) argued that Thailand was in fact 'two democracies', urban versus rural: urban dwellers voted along rational policy lines, while rural people were susceptible to vote-buying and other abuses of the electoral system. While containing elements of truth, Anek's argument neglected the agency exercised by many rural dwellers, and underestimated their political sophistication.
As the rural population from the country's hinterlands has become more politically active, Bangkok's elites, hitherto the gatekeepers of power, have been threatened by these formerly subservient, less privileged members of the Thai sociopolitical hierarchy. Grassroots activists from the provinces find their voice through engagement in demonstrations and rallies. In an era of 'rally politics' (McCargo 2012) , speeches at mass rallies became a major source of political rhetoric for the redshirts. Popular speakers at rallies are aggressive orators with a gift for parodying and ridiculing the language of the traditional elite. These and other prominent redshirts also appeared on satellite television stations widely viewed in the Northeast such as Asia Update, which carried regular reports of seminars and proposals by apparently red-leaning academics and commentators. Such themes were repeated and embellished by the hosts of local redshirt radio stations who broadcast primarily in phasaa isaan, a non-prestigious local variety linguistically closer to Lao than to Thai, and literally War of Words 6 translated the ideas and discourse of redshirt opinion-leaders into a form that chaw baan (ordinary people/villagers) or thaj baan in the local variety, could easily grasp.
A hybridised form of speech began to emerge in grassroots redshirts' discourse that incorporated abstract political terms similar to those used by redshirt leaders and commentators, while largely maintaining their linguistic identity as Northeasterners (see Saowanee and McCargo 2014) . However, in defining democracy and displaying their knowledge about it, the redshirts often refer to their lived experiences and comment on events and political actors of a much higher social status. However, in a highly stratified society such as Thailand, being candid is a challenge for someone at the bottom of the hierarchy.
How do these less privileged members of society go about expressing their beliefs, given the sociolinguistic constraints imposed by hegemonic Thai societal norms (for detailed discussions of stratified sociolinguistic norms in Thai society, see Diller 2002) ? We decided to follow Fairclough's (1989) approach that draws upon on two discursive features that link knowledge, power, and language: intertextuality and presupposition, in order to uncover their ideological beliefs.
Intertextuality and presupposition in political discourse
Language is not only a means of communication, but also indexes power relationships, identity, and conflicts. Language itself is an object both of desire and of human conflict (Foucault, 1972: 216) . Based on his ethnographic study of a Malay village, James Scott (1985) underscores this important role by showing how ordinary villagers used language to encode their subversive messages in their daily-life conversations about those they perceived to be exploitative, miserly rich fellow villagers. While one may argue that such language use does not change the status quo, that people with less power still whisper their complaints and gossip about the bearers of their misfortunes shows that they do not completely submit to imposition from powerful ones. Scott thus characterizes mundane verbal and non-verbal actions as 'weapons of the weak' which allow the relatively powerless to create solidarity and assert a degree of agency. As Scott writes:
When the poor symbolically undermine the self-awarded status of the rich by inventing nicknames, by malicious gossip, by boycotting their feasts, by blaming their greed and stinginess for the current state of affairs, they are simultaneously asserting this own claim to status (Scott 1985: 240) .
While the redshirt movement is a national one, the ways in which individual red-aligned Northeasterners engage in a 'war of words' (Scott 1985: 241) to deny their cultural marginalization have significant parallels with Scott's notion of village-level everyday resistance.
With a focus on language, this research follows the theoretical perspective that views text and talk as parts of social interaction in which speakers orient themselves toward difference (Fairclough 2003) . In Fairclough's view, intertextuality accentuates difference in 'voices' from other texts while assumption, under which presupposition is subsumed, minimizes such difference. Fairclough's approach to a critical analysis of discourse further stresses the role that language plays in sustaining ideological assumptions that underpin society.
Intertextuality, a term introduced by Julia Kristeva in 1966 (Moi 1986 ) is defined as the property of a text as being shaped by other texts. This, however, is not only a matter of linguistic interconnectedness but also a nexus between language, history, and society. Fairclough (1992: 84) characterises the nature of the embedded texts as, 'explicitly demarcated or merged in' with the main text. The notion is characterised as verbal explicitness. According to Fairclough (2003) , intertextuality involves only explicit references such as direct quotations or reported speech. We have adopted this view in this paper. Critical discourse analysis of intertextuality has demonstrated that speakers use intertextuality to 'criticise' or 'comment on' the original text, hence the term 'critical intertextuality' (Gray 2006 ) such as in parodies of political campaign videos (Tryon 2008) or in parliamentary noconfidence debates (Gadavanij 2002) . Intertextuality can also be used as a form of evidentiality (Clift 2006; van Dijk 2000) to strengthen the speaker's argument by citing a claim in the original text. In doing so, the speaker essentially indicates solidarity with the producer of the original text. Intertextuality itself may be a source of conflict as the same text can be quoted, recontextualised, and assigned different meanings by stakeholders with opposing views (Hodges 2008) . Intertextuality is therefore particularly useful in the analysis of how speakers position themselves or frame the voices of others (see Fairclough 2003) .
Presupposition examined in this study is pragmatic or speaker presupposition (Levinson 1983; Stalnaker 2000) . It refers to the assumptions and beliefs of the speaker, which must be understood in order to interpret the meaning of the utterance. While the speaker usually takes these assumptions for granted and may even be unaware of them, teasing them out from the text allows linguistic analysts to uncover the speaker's underlying beliefs.
Yule (1996) classifies presuppositions into 6 types: existential, factive, non-factive, lexical, structural, and counter-factual. Different linguistic devices invoke presupposed information. These are, for example, definite descriptions, implicative verbs (manage, forget), change of state verbs (begin, stop), cleft-sentences, and iteratives (return, before, again) (see Levinson 1983 for more examples). Critical discourse studies have shown that not only does presupposition carry with it underlying assumptions which forms part of the speaker's knowledge or beliefs, but it can also create a sense of 'consensual reality' (Chilton, 2004) which the speaker assumes the hearer to share in their common ground. It is a tool that helps to create a basis on which political terms and their associated ideologies are expressed and understood at the discourse level. It can also serve as a self-positioning tool for the us/them dichotomy. For instance, in his analysis of the news media discourses of terrorism, Van Dijk (1995) Through analysis of pragmatic devices used in invoking presupposition, we sought to reveal latent beliefs in the mind of these grassroots speakers, which were generally constrained by sociolinguistic norms of language use discussed earlier.
As democracy is essentially contested (Gallie, 1956; Swanton, 1985) , we thus confined our exploration of redshirts' understandings of the concept based on their lived experiences and knowledge of the world, which in turn influence their discourses. To do this, we specifically sought to answer the questions of what Ubon redshirts meant by democracy, and whether and to what extent they used intertextuality and presupposition to construct meanings for the concept.
The Study
This research was conducted in Ubon Ratchathani, a northeastern province of Thailand which borders Laos and Cambodia. The province is home to large numbers of redshirts and their sympathisers. Because we wished to explore the qualitative aspects of ordinary redshirts discussing of democracy through their struggles, we believe this small-scale, case study should suffice to characterize linguistic strategies employed. However, we acknowledge the limitation in generalizability of the findings.
The spoken corpus
The first author interviewed 12 redshirt supporters (referred to here by pseudonyms), eight of whom had participated in both the 2010 protests in Bangkok and the local, concurrent rallies in Ubon Ratchathani, two of whom had taken part only in the parallel protests in Ubon Ratchathani, and two of whom had participated in redshirt gatherings in the aftermath of the 2010 military crackdown. They all came from low socioeconomic backgrounds with no college education (see Appendix for their brief demographic information). The language used in the interviews was phasaa isaan, a language that lends itself to significant use of presupposition triggers on the part of informants, and one which is characterized by frequent recourse to intertextuality. The purpose of the interview was to generate a corpus of spoken texts about Thai politics and ideologies associated with the concept of democracy. The major question asked in these semi-structured interviews was: What were the redshirts fighting for?
The average amount of time spent on each interview was 90 minutes, ranging from 30 minutes to 2 hours and 15 minutes. The interviews generated an 11.7 hours (700 minutes) long corpus of spoken data. Because we aim to base our arguments on a linguistic analysis in which details and nuances in language use are carefully examined, the corpus was then transcribed using a segmental transcription invented by Haas (1964) , while tones were left unmarked. Speakers' use of phasaa isaan showed phonological influences from Central Thai, and their pronunciation was therefore transcribed as it was actually uttered. Proper names, however, were transliterated with the Royal Thai Institute system.
In each interview, the first author as the interlocutor in all conversations took care not to be the first one to introduce the word pra-chaa-thip-pa-taj 'democracy'. It should also be noted that none of the political terms discussed are common in the daily language use of the informants. The majority of these words are neologisms of Indic origin. Although some were created as phasaa isaan-Thai compounds, some stand as complete loan words by themselves.
These words belong to a high register in the Thai register hierarchy (see also Diller 1985) and are commonly found in discourses of the educated such as academics and political commentators. Examples of these words are pra-chaa-thip-pa-taj (democracy), khuam-b -
(right), rat-tha-pa-haan or pa-ti-wat (coup), am-maat (aristocrat), phaj (serf/commoner), and pha-det-kaan (dictatorship). This fact that most political terms do not have equivalents in phasaa isaan is noteworthy; they are not endogenous in the day-to-day language of these ordinary residents of Ubon. While the concepts associated with these words are very much part of their political discourse, speakers do not use them outside of the context of political discussions, in which they see themselves as stakeholders in Thai politics, and adopt linguistic terms to show their engagement.
Findings and discussion

Contextualising the struggle for democracy
Informants invariably made reference to democracy sooner or later, and none of them was satisfied with the status of democracy in Thailand. Democracy was seen either as b som buun b p 'incomplete' or b mii 'absent', and thus informants used words such as dai maa 'be achieved' or khyyn maa 'be returned' to express their goal. Informants who regarded democracy as incomplete usually said they yearned for pa-chaa-thip-pa-taj r j p -sen 'a hundred per cent democracy' or with b mii naj ya p f 'with no hidden agenda'. To better understand what the redshirt informants meant by democracy, it is important to first describe major political actors whom they regarded as their opposition. Words they used to refer to themselves included: laat-sa-d n 'citizens', pa-chaa-chon 'people', laak-aa 'grassroots', khon-baan-n k 'country bumpkins/villagers', khon-con 'poor people', and phaj 'serf/commoner'. In contrast, they identified those who opposed the movement as phuak-pha-
Party supporters', am-maat 'aristocrats', and puak-sya-lya 'them yellowshirts.' Several informants were reluctant to mention their opponents by name, opting for phrases such as waw b daj 'unable to say' and aj h 'very big'. Even when pressed, the informants opted not to elaborate on these words. Ban, a general labourer, simply smiled and looked away with silence while Krai, a street-side tailor, stated that he could not say anything about it. Likewise, some informants simply said, hu huu kan yuu 'it's known (among us),' without further elaborating on the statement. However, upon being asked whether the redshirts knew what they were up against, they said, 'yes.' That informants resorted to metapragmatic comments on their inability to fully express their thoughts for fear of repercussions speaks volume about the lack of freedom of expression. As mentioned before, Ban used the phrase naj-ya -p-f 'hidden agenda' to characterise the state of democracy in Thailand as shown in (1) presupposes that there is a hidden motive behind the discourse of Thai democracy, and implies that this motive hinders democratic development. Furthermore, his silence carried a pragmatic meaning of the kind which Kurzon (2007 Kurzon ( : 1676 glossed as, 'I will not speak,' or 'I may/must not speak.' This silence implies that he has some concern over that he would say and thus refuses to say it, which ironically says a lot about the state of free speech in Thailand. Nonetheless, Ban did try to circumvent this suppression by making intertextual references to allude to the topic he found relevant to the discussion of democracy. For instance, he made an intertextual reference to the ancient Buddhist concept expressed in an Indic term as a-neek-ni-k n-sa-moo-s n-som-mut, which was aggressively promoted by King Mongkut (Nattapol 2007). According to Nakharin (1992) the concept asserted that in
Siam (now Thailand) under the absolute monarchy, succession to the throne was based on popular consensus. After the country adopted a constitutional monarchy in 1932, key conservative intellectuals began to reinterpret the term to equate it with democracy (Kriangsak 1993). In essence, proponents of this concept saw absolute monarchy as a system embodying a democratic characteristic-approval of royal succession by the people.
However, it should be noted that the concept is not widely known to the general Thai public.
More importantly, royal succession, at least in the current dynasty, has always been by blood lineage. In fact, King Mongkut himself, as described in Baker and Pasuk, 'tried to prove that legitimate patrilineal succession was the norm in Thai history (2009: 50) .' Ban's use of this esoteric, academic term was rather surprising. Consider the exchange in example (2) where he was asked about what those who opposed the redshirts thought:
Ban: khaw waa khon sya d hua lun-l la ka aat-ca they say person red shirt head violent and so may b hen-duaj kap faaj thii yaak ca a-nu-la k yaa -chen no agree with party that want will conserve such as a-neek-ni-k n-sa-moo-s n-som-mut many-people-together-consensus 'They say the redshirts are extreme and thus may not agree with those who want to conserve (some beliefs) such as the concept of a-neek-ni-k n-samoo-s n-som-mut.'
what PARTICLE many-people-together-consensus 'What is a-neek-ni-k n-sa-moo-s n-som-mut?' Ban's quote is 'incomplete' in the sense that he did not recall the person who he heard using the term a-neek-ni-k n-sa-moo-s n-som-mut although the person was vaguely recalled as a lawyer and apparently not a key leader in the UDD movement. More important was his juxtaposition of the term and its believers--'those who disagree with the redshirts'.
To him these people thought the redshirts were extreme for being against pre-existing democratic beliefs that predated the 1932 revolution that marked the beginning of constitutional monarchy (Nakarin 1992). Without explicitly uttering the word 'conservative,'
Ban opted to say, 'what they want to a-nu-lak (conserve),' which tones down his speculation about their belief. However, the words 'they', 'disagree' and 'conserve' in the excerpt above trigger a presupposition that there exists a group of conservatives (referred to as 'they') who disagree with the redshirts. This presupposition that the conservatives exist is crucial as it also implicitly suggests that the redshirts are not conservative, at least in Ban's view.
Furthermore, Ban's use of a-neek-ni-k n-sa-moo-s n-som-mut was a striking instance of intertextuality in which Ban borrowed the term from the discourse of educated royalist intellectuals to construct a meaning of democracy as mediated by the Isan lawyer he mentioned. In doing so, Ban portrayed traditional understandings of democracy as not supportive of the redshirt movement, and thus the term which he quotes here is the voice of 'the Other'-the opposition.
Not all informants were equally articulate. Some were better spoken and more comfortable in sharing their thoughts than others. 
What democracy is
The concept of democracy was associated with different key attributes for different informants, but an intertextual analysis revealed that they were connected against the backdrop of current Thai politics. Democracy was rarely completely defined in one conversational turn in each interview; rather, informants revisited the term throughout and either repeated the meaning previously assigned, added to it, or even contradicted it. 'Justice', 'citizen participation', 'equality', and 'freedom of expression' were some commonly mentioned defining features of democracy.
Justice. Two related words were used: khuam-pen-tham 'fairness or justice' and khuam-yu-ti-tham 'justice'. In phasaa isaan, khuam-pen-tham can mean either 'fairness' or 'justice' depending on context of use. In certain contexts, it is not easy at all to distinguish between these two meanings. The informants often noted that a series of political events since the 2006 military coup created an absence of justice and equality, hence their motivation to demand 'democracy'. While some openly stated that the coup against Thaksin was not acceptable, and so joined the redshirt movement to bring him back, others, such as Krai, a street-side tailor, and Somchai, a street-food vendor, were adamant that although they appreciated his policy, they did not join the movement because of Thaksin. Rather they were motivated by what they saw as a series of unjustified attempts from different powers to eradicate Thaksin's power at all costs, to the point that they characterized as k n paj 'too much'. It is these attempts that they saw as the lack of justice in the country.
None of the informants explicitly stated that fairness or justice existed before the country's political turmoil. However, the word khyyn 'return' in examples (3) and (4) presupposes that there had previously been fairness in Thailand:
kyy haw daj khuam-pen-tham la ka khyyn suu pa-theet-thaj haw be we get fairness and so return to Thailand our '(democracy) is (when) we get fairness, when it returns to our country-Thailand.' Nit, a seafood vendor, liked this policy claiming ph khaw pa-kaat so -khaam kap yaa-septit 'because he declared war on drugs'. The adverb because introduces her presupposition that counter-narcotics measures did take place and they were drastic, as hinted by the phrase pa-kaat song-khaam 'war'. The word khaw presupposes an authoritative figure who could declare such war. Because the discussion was about Thaksin, it was implied that khaw referred to him. None of them questioned the 'justice' of the drugs war killings. Such perspectives were not confined to grassroots redshirts, however -even many Thais who strongly opposed Thaksin supported his war on drugs.
Citizen participation. Elections were often mentioned as a means for the general public to participate in decision-making in a democratic system. Consider the examples in (5) and (6) in below: (5) haw liak -l pa-chaa-thip-pa-taj haw daj lyak-ta (Phon)
we demand democracy we get election 'We had demanded democracy, and so we have had an election.' (Phon) (5), using liak -l to presuppose that democracy was absent.
The word daj here presupposes that elections and democracy are the same thing. For Phon, democracy meant elections. Phon, who was arrested in 2010 and spent over a year remanded in custody before being convicted on minor charges, stressed that all the protesters wanted was simply a new election, because Abhisit had assumed the premiership illegitimately in
2008.
To explain that citizen participation is crucial, Chai, a taxicab driver, made an intertextual reference to motto signs posted in front of military compounds as shown in this exchange: However, some informants further stressed that simply having an election is not sufficient as the prime minister must also come from the winning party. Kong, a rice farmer, stated that Yingluck Shinawatra became Prime Minister duaj myy kh pa-chaa-chon 'with the hands of the people' who voted for her.
The informants also described democracy as putting the people's needs and problems first. In doing so, they specifically alluded to Thaksin's policies. In fact, Krai stressed that the people must vote for a candidate who promises to 'duu l khon thuk khon aak' 'take care of poor people.' He further stressed that a dictator would only take care of 'phuak luaj luaj'
'them the rich'. It suggests that in Krai's conception of citizen participation, khon thuk khon ak presupposes that most people are poor and want the government to take care of themthat informants are torn between rejecting and craving paternalism. ka-a -waa la-b p pra-chaa-thip-pa-taj sa-d -k daj MARKER system democracy express able 'As I said before, expressing (oneself) is allowed in a democratic system.'
The discourse marker ka-a -waa introduces her belief that a democratic system allows freedom of expression. The presupposition underlying this statement is that Thailand is a democratic system. Otherwise she would not have used the marker. In phasaa isaan, the marker not only invokes common ground (referring to something that has been said or known among the interlocutors) but also indicates the speaker's annoyance at the interlocutor's inability to recognise such information, an attitude which can be glossed as 'you are making me say this again when you should have known it already.'
In example (9), Tai further commented on problems with the lack of freedom of expression by making an intertextual reference to an imaginary voice of the suppressive power, a sort of 'pseudo quote' or what Kotthoff (2002) calls 'staged intertextuality', as a pragmatic strategy to mimic the voice of the oppressive power:
Tai: phia -t waa sit sia naj la-b p pa-chaa-thip-pa-taj pa-theet-thaj only that right voice in system democracy Thailand mii am-naat naj kaan-tat-sin yuu l w khyy exist power in decision-making exist already that is khaw tat-sin waj-l w waa m n my si maa laaj they decide already that despite you will come many paan-daj my ka b mii sit my cam-aw-waj phuak-phaj how you so no have right you remember you serfs 'But rights in Thai democracy are predetermined by some power; they already decided that despite the many of you at the rally; "you have no rights.
Remember that! You serfs."' Tai used the pronoun khaw 'they' to refer to the supposed power. The power, in her pseudo quote, addressed the Redshirts with the derogatory second person pronoun my and phuak-phaj 'you serfs'. The imaginary quote ended with 'You have no rights. Remember that! You serfs!' Taken together, the pronoun, address term, and the quote presupposes the existence of such dominating power, which she refused to explicitly name. One might infer from the word phaj that she tried implicitly to refer to the am-maat 'aristocrats', as in the typical am-maat/phaj dichotomy often voiced at redshirt rallies. Another reading would be that she tried to refer to another powerful, yet anonymous entity. But in any case, her use of phaj highlighted her view of inequality by likening the modern day elite to old-time nobles.
Tai used intertextuality and presupposition to critique the entrenched power that deprives ordinary people of their freedom of expression. The reference to phaj is a mockery of Thailand's past as a feudalistic system. Again, the word phaj, along with its counterpart am-maat, was commonly heard at rallies and in redshirt media. But as we have seen, Tai did not stop at repeating rally-stage mantras; she further elaborated on them with staged intertextual references to make her case about democracy and the rights associated with it.
She subsequently introduced the phrase 'mute people' to make her point; 'mute people,' who are unable to vocalise, are still compelled by the urge to express themselves and thus use written signs to communicate their thoughts. Kong further explained that in a democratic system elected representatives issue laws that benefit both pa-chaa-chon 'citizens' and khaa-laat-cha-kaan 'government officials'
equally. Kong's juxtaposition of the words pa-chaa-chon and khaa-laat-cha-kaan presupposes that there were two different social categories, which implies that the two had not been equal until the country became democratic.
What democracy is not
Informants had much to discuss when it came to what they perceived as undemocratic.
Analysis of their discussion of un-democratic elements helps to bring to the fore their understandings of democracy.
Injustice and lack of fairness. For Wan, democracy cannot exist without khuam-pentham. In her view, fairness is not a prerequisite for democracy; it is democracy (see also example (3) The lack of justice and fairness is also portrayed through the rhetoric of 'double standards'. Krai made an intertextual reference to the concept of s -maat-ta-thaan 'double standards' complaining about the lack of justice as in (12): (12) sya-lya het a ka b phit
Yellow shirts do anything so not guilty sya-d het a ka phit Redshirts do anything so guilty 'The yellow shirts are never guilty of anything they do, but the redshirts are always
guilty no matter what they do.'
Krai's resentment toward the lack of justice was a direct experience he had during his trial process in which he, Phon, and other redshirts were repeatedly denied bail, while the yellowshirts who seized the country's main international airports in 2008 were still at large.
Krai depicted the judicial system as being part of the am-maat network for not being fair to the redshirts and supporting the yellowshirts.
'Double standards' was also used to depict former Prime Minister Abhisit: informants claimed that he practiced such standards, and was a beneficiary of this practice by his allies (see Abhisit 2013 for his own account of the 2009-10 political crisis). Consider example (13), in which Tai used a direct quotation to make her point: As mentioned before, some informants used 'revolution' and 'coup' interchangeably, suggesting that they understood the words as either the same thing or closely related.
Although the term rat-tha-pa-haan is commonly mentioned at redshirt rallies and on redshirt radio programs, Chai admitted that he did not quite understand the concept of rat-tha-pahaan, but he was against it because the word contains pa-haan (execute/kill) which he b mak (disliked). Unlike some other informants, Pat, a rice farmer, distinguished between 'coup d'état' and 'revolution'. During the interview, he made a slip of the tongue using pa-ti-wat instead of rat-tha-pa-haan, but quickly corrected himself along with a metalinguistic judgment of b m n 'not that'. Noi called the action a coup d'état and considered it to be 'wrong'. However, for her the coup was not wrong because it was against democracy, but because Thaksin was a 'good' prime minister whose policies helped the poor.
Waeng only used the word pa-ti-wat (instead of rat-tha-pa-haan) to refer to military overthrows of the government. He talked about pa-ti-wat as a means which the am-maat 'aristocrats' use to suppress the people in order for them to remain in power. According to Waeng, the military was associated with the am-maat although it seems that there were more figures involved. Consider the following excerpts in (14) and (15) Waeng further said that coup leader Sonthi Boonyaratglin knew who was behind the coup but refused to disclose the person's identity (see The Nation, 31 March 2012). Waeng wondered why Sonthi refused to do so. Again using reported speech to draw attention to Sonthi's muchpublicised quote, Waeng declared: bak sonthi man waa taaj l w ka t p b daj 'Sonthi said that even after (he's) dead, (he) couldn't answer (it).' Despite appearing not to know the identity of the mastermind, Waeng was confident that it was someone extremely powerful.
Like Tai, he used explicit intertextual references to allude to the implicitness of a presupposition that an unmentionable powerful figure was behind the coup.
There are a few important observations to be made about Waeng's language use.
First, Waeng's use of the third person pronoun 'man', the equivalent of 'it' in English, to refer to a powerful coup mastermind is surprising and counterintuitive. When used to refer to a human being, 'man' is derogatory. Given the rich system of honorific pronominals to mark social deixis, it would be extremely impolite to refer to someone of a higher social status by the 'wrong' pronoun, as repercussions could be very serious. Early on in the interview, In summary, to express their understanding of democracy, grassroots redshirts in this study employed intertextuality and presupposition to piece together various texts to define democracy. Embedded in these texts were political terms which were widely circulated in the news media and rally speeches; they were recontextualised to express meaning in the informants' own terms. To strengthen their claims about democracy or undermine their opponents', the informants drew different voices from both the discourses of the redshirts and their elite opponents. They left verbal clues that trigger presupposition in order to serve various pragmatic purposes including identifying group membership, indexing their opponents, and criticising undemocratic actions, forming their own 'consensual reality' which revolved around political frustrations among members of the movement. Despite inconsistencies, the redshirts in this study used language to reveal their roles as political actors. As members of the lower echelon of Thailand's profoundly hierarchical society, faced with laws that carry harsh punishments for those who challenge the traditional social order (see Streckfuss, 2011) , grassroots redshirts struggled with the double challenges of articulating their beliefs about democracy and doing so in a politically repressive environment.
Conclusion
This study sought to explain how grassroots redshirt protesters assigned meanings to democracy through the use of intertextuality and presupposition. We have shown that they largely defined 'democracy' based on their lived experiences and on what they witnessed in Thai politics. In doing so, they mainly used intertextuality when positioning themselves toward the different voices of speakers in the quoted or reported text. In the latter case, staged intertextuality was also used not only to discredit the content of the original text but also to satirise its producer for being anti-democratic. The informants used presupposition about characteristics of democracy. Interestingly, they also used it as a strategy to discuss undemocratic actions by powerful political actors. Given that phasaa isaan allowed various linguistic strategies as presupposition triggers, the informants employed them to express their understandings of democracy despite a degree of contradiction and confusion. Building on the arguments of Fairclough (2003) 
